Spare a thought for our Indigenous brothers and sisters amidst the political storm raging around the wildfire response – or
lack thereof – by the Australian government, personalized around the
(in)actions of Prime Minister Scott Morrison.
Remarkable footage of Morrison forcing a young, distressed, woman to shake his hand, and being
snubbed by a firefighter, has predictably gone viral.
But governments are not always punished in an election for
actual or perceived ineffectiveness in the face of a disaster. President George W. Bush survived Katrina. NZ
PM John Key survived the Christchurch earthquakes (his party’s position in the
munted city improved in the next election, although anecdotally many opposition
supporters may have been forced by their housing situation to relocate to other
electorates).
So, what does the research say?
I did a quick Google Scholar search
and pulled up some stuff.
First, a study published over 50 years
ago by Abney and Hill
(1966)
made some interesting observations. Political
scientists have traditionally assumed that political behavior is somewhat
determined by their physical environment. We should not, for example, “expect a
homogeneous political culture in a country sharply divided by mountains.” They
go on to say that disasters have historically been considered ‘bad omens’ for
sitting governments but note little empirical research on this: “political
activity seems more determined by social environment than physical.” However,
“such catastrophes place great stress upon the social framework and thus test
the adaptive capabilities of the political system.”
Bien entendu. Since then there have been a number of
studies. Summaries of just a few…
Olson and
Gawronski (2010)
give a very useful overview of the issues. They ask “Why is it that some
authorities, governments, administrations, and even entire regimes emerge from
disasters more popular and politically stronger, while most appear to emerge
less popular and politically weaker, sometimes fatally so?” They argue that the
“often problematic political consequences” of a disaster can be seen as
‘‘Maslowian Shocks’’ (yes, that Maslow who drew in Native American philosophy
for this hierarchy of needs). A disaster rips off the scab of governance (“strong
revelatory components” as they put it) as the voting public analyze government
performance along six dimensions: capability, competence, compassion,
correctness, credibility, and anticipation.
Bodet, Thomas,
and Tessier (2016) found
support for the incumbent Calgary mayor
increased after the devastating 2013 floods, albeit at a lower rate in those areas
of residential flooding. However, they acknowledged flooded areas differed “systematically”
from those areas not flooded “in ways key to the election outcome” (p.85): “When
analyzed more conservatively, results show that the flood had no effect on
incumbent support or voter turnout.”
Arceneaux and
Stein (2006)
looked at a Houston election (November) that followed their (June) floods of 2001. Voters did punish the incumbent mayor for
the flood if they believed he/the city was responsible for flood prep. This
expectation of responsibility was shaped by whether a voter’s neighborhood had
been hit by flood waters, and their knowledge of local politics. Sainz-Santamaria and Anderson (2013) examined U.S. disaster preparedness
spending between 1985 and 2008 and found increased spending in competitive
counties. They advise caution in demanding increased DRR spending as the
dollars may be put to electoral ends instead of public safety.
The
literature seems to be dominated by US case studies. Vanderleeuw, Liu, and Williams (2008) provide a very interesting analysis of New
Orleans mayoralty election, post-Katrina (a more reasonable scale of analysis
than the race for president (pun intended…). They describe a 15.8% decline in
registered African-American voters and a decline of white registered voters of
only 5.1%. So, while a black mayor was returned, “whites clearly were in a
better position than they had been to challenge black domination in New Orleans
politics.”
(Strange
language when taken out of context, so please go to the original paper if you
wanna argue, and take it up with the authors. I’m just cutting and pasting…)
From
the US again, Reeves (2011) identified a relationship between a state’s
‘electoral competitiveness’ and the likelihood and number of presidential
disaster declarations. Reeves argues that “presidents use unilateral powers for
particularistic aims to gain electoral support.” His findings are based on data
drawn from 1981 to 2004, with this relationship existing since the 1988
Stafford Act which expanded presidents powers in declaring a disaster. (The
Stafford Act also has implications for Native Americans on reserve. More on
that another time). Reeves also argues the use of presidential powers in these
events do have the intended electoral benefits: voters will reward presidents
for declaring a disaster in their state, more than a one point increase in
support.
But
what about Australia?
MacLean (2016) in one of the more entertaining papers I have
read, hypothesizes the processes and transition of governmental power in a
Zombie apocalypse. He argues that, at least in the initial stages, a zombie
apocalypse will see coordinated emergency management from the three spheres of Australian
government. But as the zombies spread across Australia, he predicts “that both
the rule of law and effective communication networks will break down”. In this
situation, the Commonwealth government will struggle to “project its power” and
resistance will default down to the “effective use of people and resources” at the
State and then regional or local government levels. And like any B movie, “[i]n
the worst-case scenario, all the current recognised forms of government may
fail and survival will depend on new polities created out of desperate need.”
Cold
comfort indeed.
In
answer the question, ‘Will the wildfires lead to a change of government In
Australia?’ I’d have to kick for touch and say maybe. The next election will
undoubtedly feature climate change, and many new leaders will arise, as we have
seen in NZ through the Green Party. I do think PM Morrison is on shaky ground
and whether he survives to lead his party into the next election is another
matter, and down to the seething mass of jealousies and aspirations within his own
party. I like the six dimensions
provided by Olsen and Gawronski: capability, competence, compassion,
correctness, credibility, and anticipation. From a distance, I’d rate the
Australian government as C+, C-, C-, B-, D, and D respectively.
There's very few Indigenous voices to be heard in all this.
Time to break out the Mad Max memes?
References
Arceneaux, K.,
& Stein, R. M. (2006). Who Is Held Responsible When Disaster Strikes? the
Attribution of Responsibility for a Natural Disaster in an Urban Election.
Journal of Urban Affairs, 28(1), 43-53.
Retrieved from
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0735-2166.2006.00258.x.
doi:10.1111/j.0735-2166.2006.00258.x
Olson, R. S.,
& Gawronski, V. T. (2010). From Disaster Event to Political Crisis: A
“5C+A” Framework for Analysis.
International
Studies Perspectives, 11(3), 205-221. Retrieved from
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2010.00404.x.
doi:10.1111/j.1528-3585.2010.00404.x
